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Abstract: In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in
the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a
feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First,
we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when
couples’ preferences are ‘responsive,’ i.e., when Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance
algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate
that the new NRMP algorithm may also be manipulated by couples acting as singles.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, the proportion of women attending college has steadily been increasing during
the last decades. Thus, it is not surprising that the number of couples searching jointly for a job in
the same labor market has been increasing as well. In this paper we deal with a specific US labor
market that, because of its history and development, is a bench mark for several other matching
markets in the US and Canada. Each year thousands of medical school graduates seek their first
employment through a centralized matching process, the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP).1 This clearinghouse was initiated in the 1950’s in response to persistent failures to
organize the market in a timely and orderly way by decentralized means. Roth (1984) would
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later explain its success by showing that the clearinghouse in fact employed the hospital-optimal
variant of the so-called deferred acceptance algorithm, developed by Gale and Shapley (1962)
who at the time were not aware of the relation with the NRMP.
Around the mid 1970’s voluntary and orderly participation in the NRMP started to drop.
What happened then was that a growing number of couples in need of two positions in the
same vicinity left the centralized market and started to negotiate directly with hospitals (see
Checker, 1973). As a consequence, the labor market became, just as before the 1950’s, prone to
chaos and dissatisfaction on all sides. A hypothesis offered by Roth (1984) is that the chaotic
conditions reflect the instability of the matching procedure. If couples and hospitals find it
profitable to make their own arrangements outside of the matching program it must be that
the matching procedure is unstable with respect to couples. This indeed turned out to be the
case. In the mid 1990’s a crisis of confidence2 in the matching procedure on the applicants side
finally induced the NRMP Board of Directors to design a new algorithm. Apart from recovering
students’ confidence by favoring their side, the algorithm was also meant to deal with couples
in an appropriate manner.3 The first match with the new algorithm was carried out in 1998.
Roth and Peranson (1999) describe how the new algorithm was designed. Furthermore, using
computational simulations and analyzing previous data, they show that the new algorithm is to
be expected to perform well in practice. Roth (2002) gives a more recent review of the redesign
of the NRMP algorithm in the context of analyzing the ‘engineering aspects’ of economic design.
A nice overview of how the new algorithm was designed to address the problems that occur in
the presence of couples is given in Roth (2002, Section 2.4.1).
In this note, we address two issues that are of importance for couples that participate in the
new NRMP algorithm. The first issue concerns the stability of the matching obtained by the
NRMP algorithm. A matching is ‘stable’ if (a) each couple and each hospital have acceptable
matches, and (b) no couple and no pair of hospitals prefer a mutual match to the ones that have
been assigned. Roth (1984) and Sotomayor (unpublished note) independently demonstrate the
possibility of instability in the presence of couples. However, Klaus and Klijn (2005a) show that
for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of ‘responsive’ preferences, there
is always a stable matching that moreover can be found by applying Gale and Shapley’s (1962)
deferred acceptance algorithm. In Example 3.1 we construct a matching market in which couples
have responsive preferences and where there is a unique stable matching, which hence can be
easily obtained by Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm. Surprisingly, we
still find that the new NRMP algorithm may cycle, that is, not find the stable matching.
Next, couples may wonder if they should apply to the NRMP as a couple or as two seemingly
independent applicants. With our second couples market (Example 3.2) we show that the new
NRMP algorithm may indeed be prone to strategic manipulation by the members of a couple
pretending to be singles, i.e., a couple may be better off by applying as two separate applicants.
Both our couples markets are realistic in the sense that (a) couples’ preferences can be easily
explained in terms of individual preferences and distances between hospitals, and (b) hospitals
have the same preferences over students (which can be justified by final grades or test scores).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our matching model with
couples. In Section 3, we present the two potential problems of the new NRMP algorithm.
Finally, in Section 4 we discuss the difficulties to avoid these problems.
2Many students believed that the matching was not conducted in their best interest and that possibilities for
strategic manipulations existed; see Roth and Peranson (1999).
3In fact, three other issues that are not relevant in the present discussion were addressed as well. See Roth (2002,
p. 1355) for details.
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2 Matching with couples: the model
We describe a model with 4 hospitals and 2 pairs of students; H = {h1, h2, h3, h4}, S =
{s1, s2, s3, s4}, and C = {c1, c2} = {(s1, s2), (s3, s4)} are the sets of hospitals, students, and
couples, respectively. Each hospital has exactly one position to be filled. Our definitions and
results can easily be adapted to more general situations that include other couples as well as
single agents and hospitals with multiple positions.
Hospitals’ preferences: Each hospital h ∈ H has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation h over the set of students S and the prospect of having its position unfilled, denoted
by ∅; for instance, P (h) = s4, s2, ∅, s1, s3 indicates that hospital h prefers student s4 to s2, and
considers students s1 and s3 to be unacceptable. Let PH = {P (h)}h∈H .
Students’ preferences: Similarly, each student s ∈ S has an individual strict, transitive, and
complete preference relation s over the set of hospitals and the prospect of being unemployed,
denoted by u. We assume that these individual preferences are the preferences a student has if
he is single. For instance, P (s) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u indicates that student s prefers hi to hi+1 for
i = 1, 2, 3 and prefers being employed to being unemployed. Let PS = {P (s)}s∈S .
Couples’ preferences: Each couple c ∈ C has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation c over all possible combination of ordered pairs of (different) hospitals and the prospect
of being unemployed. We denote a generic ordered pair of hospitals by (hp, hq), where hp and hq
indicate either a hospital or being unemployed. For instance, P (c) = (h4, h2), (h3, h4), (h4, u),
etc., indicates that couple c = (s1, s2) prefers s1 and s2 being matched to h4 and h2, respectively,
to being matched to h3 and h4, respectively, and so on. Let PC = {P (c)}c∈C .
Singles and couples markets: Now, the standard one-to-one two-sided matching market with
single students, or singles market for short, is denoted by (PH , PS). Since singles markets and
some of the classical results for singles markets are well-known, for a detailed description we
refer to Roth and Sotomayor (1990). We define a one-to-one matching market with couples, or
a couples market for short, by (PH , PC).
Matchings: A matching µ for a couples market (PH , PC) is an assignment of students and
hospitals such that each student is assigned to at most one hospital in H or to u (which can
be assigned to multiple students), each hospital in H is assigned to at most one student or to
∅ (which can be assigned to multiple hospitals), and a student is assigned to a hospital if and
only if the hospital is assigned to the student. A matching µ is completely described by the list
µ(H) = µ(h1), µ(h2), µ(h3), µ(h4) of students in S or ∅ matched to hospitals h1, h2, h3, h4.
Stability: Finally, we define stability for couples markets (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
First, for a matching to be stable, it should always be better for students (one or both members
in a couple) to accept the position(s) offered by the matching instead of voluntarily choosing
unemployment and for hospitals it should always be better to accept the student assigned by
the matching instead of leaving the position unfilled. A matching µ is individually rational if
(i1) for all c = (sk, sl), (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(µ(sk), u), (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(u, µ(sl)),
and (µ(sk), µ(sl))c(u, u);
(i2) for all h ∈ H, µ(h)h∅.
Second, if one partner in a couple can improve the given matching for the couple by switching to
another hospital such that this hospital is better off as well, then we would expect this mutually
beneficial trade to be carried out, rendering the given matching unstable. A similar statement
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holds if both students in the couple can improve. For a given matching µ, (c = (sk, sl), (hp, hq))
is a blocking coalition if
(b1) (hp, hq)c(µ(sk), µ(sl));
(b2) [hp ∈ H implies skhp µ(hp)] and [hq ∈ H implies slhq µ(hq)].
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and if there are no blocking coalitions.4
Roth (1984) and Sotomayor (unpublished note) demonstrate that stable matchings may not
exist in the presence of couples. Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b) prove existence for couples mar-
ket where couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’ by applying Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred
acceptance algorithm to the ‘associated individual preferences.’ A couple’s preferences are re-
sponsive if the unilateral improvement of one partner’s job is considered beneficial for the couple
as well. For instance, responsive preferences may reflect situations where couples search for jobs
in the same metropolitan area (if one partner switches to a job he/she prefers and the couple
can still live together, then the couple is better off).5
Responsive preferences: Couple c = (sk, sl) has responsive preferences if there exist associated
individual preferences sk and sl such that for all hp, hq, hr ∈ H ∪ {u}, [hpskhr implies
(hp, hq)c(hr, hq)] and [hpslhr implies (hq, hp)c(hq, hr)]. If these preferences sk and sl
exist, then they are unique.
3 Couples and the new NRMP algorithm
The formal and complete description of the new algorithm used by the NRMP is outside the scope
of this note. Essentially, the new algorithm adapts (from the original one-to-one model without
couples) Roth and Vande Vate’s (1990) dynamic process to find stable matchings. Flowchart 1 in
the Appendix describes concisely the parts of the new Applicant Proposing Couples Algorithm
(APCA) used by the NRMP that are relevant for applying the algorithm to Examples 3.1 and
3.2 below.6
First, we demonstrate that even for responsive preferences the algorithm might cycle without
selecting a stable matching. This example is particularly interesting because the unique stable
matching could be easily found using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Example 3.1 The New NRMP Algorithm may cycle for Responsive Preferences
Consider the couples market (PH , PC) given in Table 1. Students’ individual preferences PS
equal P (s1) = P (s2) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u, P (s3) = h2, h1, h3, h4, u, and P (s4) = h3, h4, h2, h1, u.
Note that the couples’ preferences are responsive: any unilateral improvement of one partner’s
job is considered beneficial for the couple as well. Moreover, hospitals have identical preferences
over students, which can be easily justified if hospitals rank students according to final grades or
other test scores. The unique stable matching for (PH , PC) is µ(H) = s2, s3, s1, s4 (Appendix,
Table 2), which, because of responsiveness, is the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
4In order to keep notation as simple as possible, we allow some redundancy in the definition of stability with
respect to (i1) and (b1).
5For a discussion of results related to responsiveness in couples markets we refer to Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b).
6The complete flowchart describing the APCA algorithm that we used to derive Flowchart 1 was kindly made
available to us by Alvin Roth.
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Next, we apply the Applicant Proposing Couples Algorithm to this couples market.7 Suppose
that couple (s3, s4) is at the top of the stack (a symmetric process occurs if instead couple (s1, s2)
is at the top of the stack). The algorithm starts with the empty matching µ0 (H) = ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅
and cycles over the unstable matchings µI (H) = ∅, s3, s4, ∅, µII (H) = s1, s2, ∅, ∅, µIII (H) =
s3, ∅, s4, ∅, µIV (H) = s2, s1, ∅, ∅, and finally back to µI (H). 
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 s1s2 s3s4
s2 s2 s2 s2 h1h2 h2h3
s3 s3 s3 s3 h1h3 h2h4
s1 s1 s1 s1 h1h4 h2h1
s4 s4 s4 s4 h2h1 h1h3
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ h2h3 h1h4
h2h4 h1h2
h3h1 h3h4
h3h2 h3h2
h3h4 h3h1
h4h1 h4h3
h4h2 h4h2
h4h3 h4h1
...
...
Table 1: Responsive preferences for which the new NRMP algorithm cycles
Finally, we illustrate the possibility that, if the APCA is used, a couple may obtain a better
pair of positions by registering as single students rather than as a couple.
Example 3.2 Pretending to be Single may be Beneficial
Consider the couples market (PH , PC) where hospitals h1 and h2 are located in one city and
hospitals h3 and h4 in some other, distant city. Students and couples have the same pref-
erences over hospitals: P (s) = h1, h2, h3, h4, u for each s ∈ S and P (s1,s2) = P (s3, s4) =
(h1, h2) , (h2, h1) , (h3, h4) , (h4, h3) , . . . (the tail can be anything). In other words, a couple would
look for two positions in another market before accepting two positions located in different cities.
The hospitals’ preferences over students are P (h) = s1, s3, s4, s2, ∅ for every h ∈ H.
Assume first that the four students register as couples, and couple (s1, s2) is at the top of
the stack. Then, the APCA yields the matching µ˜(H) = s1, s2, s3, s4.
However, if s3 and s4 register as single students and, as a consequence, the order in the stack
changes to s3, s4, (s1, s2), then the algorithm yields the matching µˆ(H) = s3, s4, s1, s2. At this
matching couple (s3, s4) is strictly better off than at matching µ˜.8 
7For a step by step description of the execution of the algorithm for this example as well as Example 3.2 see
http://pareto.uab.es/fklijn/papers/couplesnrmp.htm or contact any of the authors.
8If instead the order in the stack changes to s4, s3, (s1, s2), then the algorithm produces the matching µ¯(H) =
s4, s3, s1, s2, in which couple (s3, s4) is also strictly better off than at matching µ˜.
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4 Two final remarks
One may wonder whether the two potential problems we describe in the previous section can
be fixed. First, consider the problem of finding a stable matching whenever one exists. If
couples’ preferences are responsive, a stable matching exists and can be found by applying
the DA-algorithm to the associated individual preferences. (Note that the DA-algorithm is
polynomially bounded in time.) However, if couples’ preferences are not responsive, then we
cannot construct associated individual preferences.9 Furthermore, in any attempt to construct
associated individual preferences for a non-responsive preference relation, one might neglect
an important complementarity, e.g., the wish to live together in the same city, that is crucial
for the couple’s preference relation. Hence, with the existence of non-responsive preferences
the DA-algorithm cannot be applied. In addition, for some couples markets no stable matching
exists (Roth, 1984 and Sotomayor, unpublished note) and the problem of determining if a couples
market has a stable matching is NP complete (Ronn, 1990). Unfortunately, this suggests that for
non-trivial domains of couples’ preferences (e.g., domains containing the subdomain of (weakly)
responsive preferences), we might not be able to construct any computationally reasonable
algorithm that will either find a stable matching or report an empty output if there is none.
As for the second potential problem, i.e., manipulation by couples acting as single students,
we first note that any algorithm that does not accommodate couples is not satisfactory for
couples with non-responsive preferences. The new NRMP algorithm does accommodate couples
and Roth (2002, p. 1359) explains the reason that single students are processed first as follows:
“Because sequencing decisions had no systematic effect on outcomes it was decided to design the
algorithm to promote rapid convergence to stability. Based on these computational experiments,
the applicant proposing algorithm for the NRMP was designed so that all single applicants
are admitted to the algorithm for processing before any couples are admitted.” So, it seems
that if we want to avoid the problem uncovered in Example 3.2, and we do not mind slower
convergence, we may as well switch the priority of the single students over the couples. In
that case single students may try to game the mechanism by forming artificial couples with
responsive preferences. However, we conjecture that the formation of an artificial couple by two
singles is less likely than the artificial split-up of a couple. Alternatively, one may consider to
start from scratch and try to construct a completely new algorithm that accommodates couples.
Unfortunately, here again Ronn’s (1990) NP-completeness result for general couples markets
indicates that it might be impossible to find a computationally reasonable algorithm.
9In case the preferences are weakly responsive (see Klaus and Klijn, 2005a,b) we can construct another kind
of associated individual preferences which enable us again to invoke the DA-algorithm. A couple has weakly
responsive preferences if there are individual preferences for the members of the couple that generate, in a
similar way as in the case of responsive preferences, the couple’s list of acceptable combinations of hospitals and
unemployment.
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5 Appendix
Hospitals Blocking coalitions?
no. h1 h2 h3 h4 Students Hospitals
1 s1 s2 s3 s4 (s3, s4) (h1, h4)
2 s1 s2 s4 s3 (s3, s4) (h1, h3)
3 s1 s3 s2 s4 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
4 s1 s3 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
5 s1 s4 s2 s3 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
6 s1 s4 s3 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
7 s2 s1 s3 s4 (s3, s4) (h2, h4)
8 s2 s1 s4 s3 (s3, s4) (h2, h3)
9 s2 s3 s1 s4 −− −−
10 s2 s3 s4 s1 (s1, s2) (h3, h1)
11 s2 s4 s1 s3 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
12 s2 s4 s3 s1 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
13 s3 s1 s2 s4 (s3, s4) (h2, h4)
14 s3 s1 s4 s2 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
15 s3 s2 s1 s4 (s1, s2) (h3, h1)
16 s3 s2 s4 s1 (s1, s2) (h3, h1)
17 s3 s4 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
18 s3 s4 s2 s1 (s1, s2) (h2, h1)
19 s4 s1 s2 s3 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
20 s4 s1 s3 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
21 s4 s2 s1 s3 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
22 s4 s2 s3 s1 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
23 s4 s3 s1 s2 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
24 s4 s3 s2 s1 (s1, s2) (h1, h2)
Table 2: Example 3.1, all individually rational matchings (with blocking coalition when possible)
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 0.0  Initialization: Stack contains all applicants (couples at bottom); Initial 
matching: µ=∅ (all positions unfilled, all applicants unmatched). 
1.t  Any applicants in stack? 
8.t  Check the stability of the matching 
at which each h i  is matched to the 
applicant it is holding. Stable? 
No 
2.t  Select the individual applicant or couple (a=a i  or a=(a i ,a j )) 
at the top of the applicant stack (and remove from stack): set n=1. 
Yes 
3.t-1.q  Applicant’s preference list 
has at least n entries preferred to µ? 
3.t-2.q  Applicant applies to nth choice on 
preference list (if applicant is a couple, this may 
involve an application to two distinct hospitals). 
Yes 
3.t-3.q  Does (each) hospital (h=h i or h=(h i ,h j )) applied to either have a vacancy, or 
have no vacancy but prefer applicant to least preferred other application currently held?  
n=n+1 
q=q+1 
No 
Stop. Current 
matching is 
final matching. 
Yes 
4.t  Does (either) hospital need to reject previously held 
applicant to make room for holding new applicant? 
Yes 
(Hospital now “holds” new applicant) No 
µ=µ∪(h,a) 
[(h,a)={h i ,a i } or {(h i ,a i ),(h j ,a j )}] 
5.t  Put rejected applicant(s) a’ at the top of the stack. 
Yes 
6.t  Is a rejected applicant a i  a member of a couple (a i ,a k ) AND 
is a k ’s application currently being held by some hospital h k ? 
No 
µ=µ∪(h,a)/(h,a’) 
7.t  Withdraw a k ’s application from h k  (making 
h k ’s position vacant). 
Yes 
Loop detector here: same couple 
displaced by same applicant? 
µ=µ∪(h,a)/{(h i ,a i ),(h k ,a k )} 
No 
Flowchart 1: The analyzed part of the Applicant Proposing Couples Algorithm (APCA) 
t=1
t=t+1
q=1 
No 
···
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